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Overlay Protection Against Link Failures Using
Network Coding
Ahmed E. Kamal, Aditya Ramamoorthy, Long Long, Shizheng Li
Abstract—This paper introduces a network coding-based pro-
tection scheme against single and multiple link failures. The
proposed strategy ensures that in a connection, each node receives
two copies of the same data unit: one copy on the working
circuit, and a second copy that can be extracted from linear
combinations of data units transmitted on a shared protection
path. This guarantees instantaneous recovery of data units upon
the failure of a working circuit. The strategy can be implemented
at an overlay layer, which makes its deployment simple and
scalable. While the proposed strategy is similar in spirit to the
work of Kamal ’07 & ’10, there are significant differences. In
particular, it provides protection against multiple link failures.
The new scheme is simpler, less expensive, and does not require
the synchronization required by the original scheme. The sharing
of the protection circuit by a number of connections is the key to
the reduction of the cost of protection. The paper also conducts
a comparison of the cost of the proposed scheme to the 1+1 and
shared backup path protection (SBPP) strategies, and establishes
the benefits of our strategy.
Index Terms—Network protection, Overlay protection, Net-
work coding, Survivability
I. INTRODUCTION
Research on techniques for providing protection to networks
against link and node failures has received significant attention
[1]. Protection, which is a proactive technique, refers to
reserving backup resources in anticipation of failures, such that
when a failure takes place, the pre-provisioned backup circuits
are used to reroute the traffic affected by the failure. Several
protection techniques are well known, e.g., in 1+1 protection,
the connection traffic is simultaneously transmitted on two link
disjoint paths. The receiver, picks the path with the stronger
signal. On the other hand in 1:1 protection, transmission on
the backup path only takes place in the case of failure. Clearly,
1+1 protection provides instantaneous recovery from failure,
at increased cost. However, the cost of protection circuits is
at least equal to the cost of the working circuits, and typically
exceeds it. To reduce the cost of protection circuits, 1:1
protection has been extended to 1:N protection, in which one
backup circuit is used to protect N working circuits. However,
failure detection and data rerouting are still needed, which
may slow down the recovery process. In order to reduce the
cost of protection, while still providing instantaneous recovery,
references [13], [15] proposed the sharing of one set of
protection circuits by a number of working circuits, such that
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each receiver in a connection is able to receive two copies of
the same data unit: one on the working circuit, and another one
from the protection circuit. Therefore, when a working circuit
fails, another copy is readily available from the protection
circuit. The sharing of the protection circuit was implemented
by transmitting data units such that they are linearly combined
inside the network, using the technique of network coding
[16]. Two linear combinations are formed and transmitted
in two opposite directions on a p-Cycle [4]. We refer to
this technique as 1+N protection, since one set of protection
circuits is used to simultaneously protect a number of working
circuits. The technique was generalized for protection against
multiple failures in [14].
In this paper, we propose a new method for protection
against multiple failures that is related to the techniques of
[15], [14]. Our overall objective is still the same; however,
the proposed scheme improves upon the previous techniques
in several aspects. First, instead of cycles, we use paths
to carry the linear combinations. This reduces the cost of
implementation even further, since in the worst case the
path can be implemented using the cycle less one segment
(that may consist of several links). Moreover, a path may
be feasible, while a cycle may not. Second, each linear
combination includes data units transmitted from the same
round, as opposed to transmitting data units from different
rounds as proposed in [15]. This simplifies the implementation
and synchronization between nodes. This aspect is especially
important when considering a large number of protection
paths, since synchronization becomes a critical issue in this
case. The protocol implementation is therefore self-clocked
since data units at the heads of the local buffers in each node
are combined provided that they belong to the same round.
Overall, these improvements result in a simple and scalable
protocol that can be implemented at the overlay layer. The
paper also includes details about implementing the proposed
strategy. A network coding scheme to protect against adversary
errors and failures under a similar model is proposed in [2],
in which more protection resources are required.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II we intro-
duce our network model and assumptions. In Section III we
introduce the modified technique for protection against single
failures. Implementation issues are discussed in Section IV.
In Section V we present a generalization of this technique for
protecting against multiple failures. The encoding coefficient
assignment is discussed in Section VI. In Section VII we
present an integer linear programming formulation to provision
paths to protect against single failures. Section VIII provides
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some results on the cost of implementing the proposed tech-
nique, and compares it to 1+1 protection and SBPP. Section
IX concludes this paper with a few remarks.
II. MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this section we introduce our network model and the
operational assumptions. We also define a number of variables
and parameters which will be used throughout the paper.
A. Network Model
We assume that the network is represented by an undirected
graph, G(V,E), where V is the set of nodes and E is the
set of edges. Each node corresponds to a switching node,
e.g., a router, a switch or a crossconnect. Network users
access the network by connecting to input ports of such
nodes, possibly through multiplexing devices. Each undirected
edge corresponds to two transmission links, e.g., fibers, which
carry data in two opposite directions. The capacity of each
link is a multiple of a basic transmission unit, which can be
wavelengths, or smaller tributaries, such as DS-3, or OC-3. In
this paper, we do not impose an upper limit on the capacity of
a link, and we assume that it carries a sufficiently large number
of basic tributaries, i.e., we consider the uncapacitated case.
In order to protect against single link failures, the network
graph needs to be at least 2-connected. That is, between each
pair of nodes, there needs to be at least two link disjoint
paths. The number of protection paths, and the connections
protected by each of these paths depends on the connections
and their end points, as well as the network graph. An example
of connection protection in NSFNET will be given in Section
III. In general, for protection against M link failures, the graph
needs to be (M + 1)-connected.
Since providing protection to connections will require the
use of finite field arithmetic, these functions are better imple-
mented in the electronic domain. Therefore, we assume that
protection is provided at a layer that is above the optical layer,
and this is why we refer to this type of protection as overlay
protection.
B. Operational Assumptions
We make the following operational assumptions:
1) The protection is at the connection level, and it is
assumed that all connections that are protected together
will have the same transport capacity, which is the max-
imum bit rate that has to be handled by the connection.
We refer to this transport capacity as B1.
2) All connections are bidirectional.
3) Paths used by connections that are jointly protected are
link disjoint.
4) A set of connections will be protected together by a
protection path. The protection path is bidirectional,
and it passes through all end nodes of the protected
1 Throughout this paper we assume that all connections that are protected
together have the same transport capacity. The case of unequal transport
capacities can also be handled, but will not be addressed in this paper.
connections. The protection path is also link disjoint
from the paths used by the protected connections.
5) Links of the protection path protecting a set of connec-
tions have the same capacity of these connections, i.e.,
B.
6) Segments of the protection path are terminated at each
connection end node on the path. The data received on
the protection path segment is processed, and retrans-
mitted on the outgoing port, except for the two extreme
nodes on the protection path.
7) Data units are fixed and equal in size.
8) Nodes are equipped with sufficiently large buffers. The
upper bound on buffer sizes will be derived in Section
IV.
9) When a link carrying active (working) circuits fails, the
receiving end of the link receives empty data units. We
regard this to be a data unit containing all zeroes.
10) The system works in time slots. In each time slot a new
data unit is transmitted by each end node of a connection
on its primary path2. In addition, this end node also
transmits a data unit in each direction on the protection
path. The exact specification of the protocol, and the
data unit is given later.
11) The amount of time consumed in solving a system of
equations is negligible in comparison to the length of a
time slot. This ensures that the buffers are stable3.
The symbols used in this paper are listed in Table I, and
will be further explained within the text. The upper half of the
table defines symbols which relate to the working, or primary
connections, and the lower half introduces the symbols used
in the protection circuits. All operations in this paper are over
the finite field GF (2m) where m is the length of the data
unit in bits. It should be noted that all addition operations (+)
over GF (2m) can be simply performed by bitwise XOR’s. In
fact, for protection against single-link failures we only require
addition operations, which justifies the last assumption above.
III. 1+N PROTECTION AGAINST SINGLE LINK FAILURES
In this section we introduce our strategy for implementing
network coding-based protection against single link failures.
Consider a set of N bidirectional, unicast connections, where
the number of connections is given by N = |N|. Connection
i ↔ j is between nodes Si and Tj . Nodes Si and Tj belong
to the two ordered sets S and T , respectively. Data units are
transmitted by nodes in S and T in rounds, such that the data
unit transmitted from Si to Tj in round n is denoted by di(n),
and the data unit transmitted from Tj to Si in the same round
is denoted by uj(n) 4. The data units received by nodes Si
and Tj are denoted by uˆj and dˆi, respectively, and can be zero
2The terms primary and working circuits, or paths, will be used interchange-
ably.
3 Typically, a single connection will have a bit rate on the order of 10’s or
100’s of Mbps that is much lower than the capacity of a fiber or a wavelength.
Therefore, we assume that the processing elements of a switching node will
be able to process the data units within the transmission time of one data unit.
4For simplicity, the round number, n, may be dropped when it is obvious.
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TABLE I
LIST OF SYMBOLS: UPPER HALF ARE SYMBOLS USED FOR WORKING
PATHS, AND LOWER HALF ARE SYMBOLS FOR PROTECTION PATHS.
Symbol Meaning
N set of connections to be protected
N number of connections = |N|
S , T two disjoint ordered sets of communicating nodes,
such that a node in S communicates with a node
in T
Sk , Tk sets of connection end nodes protected by Pk
Si, Tj nodes in S and T , respectively
di, uj data units sent by nodes Si and Tj , respectively
dˆi, uˆj data units sent by nodes Si and Tj , respectively,
on the primary paths, which are received by their
respective receiver nodes
T (Si) node in T transmitting to and receiving from Si
S(Tj) node in S transmitting to and receiving from Tj
B the capacity protected by the protection path
n round number
M total number of failures to be protected against
(M = 1 in Section III).
P (or Pk) bidirectional path used for protection
P set of protection paths
S, T unidirectional paths of P started by S1 and T1,
respectively
σ(Si)(σ(Tj )) the next node downstream from Si (respectively
Tj) on S
σ−1(Si)(σ
−1(Tj)) the next node upstream from Si (respectively Tj)
on S
τ(Si)(τ(Tj)) the next node downstream from Si (respectively
Tj) on T
τ−1(Si)(τ
−1(Tj )) the next node upstream from Si (respectively Tj)
on T
χw(χP) delay over working (protection) path
FS(Si)(FT(Si)) buffers at node Si used for transmission on the S
(T) paths
αi↔j,k scaling coefficient used for connection between Si
and Tj on Pk
ye(ze) The data unit transmitted on link e ∈ S ( e ∈ T
respectively)
K The total number of protection paths, i.e., |P|
in the case of a failure on the primary circuit between Si and
Tj .
The two ordered sets, S = (S1, S2, . . . , SN ) and T =
(T1, T2, . . . , TN ) are of equal lengths, N , which is the number
of connections that are jointly protected. If two nodes com-
municate, then they must be in different ordered sets. These
two ordered sets define the order in which the protection path,
P, traverses the connections’ end nodes. The ordered set of
nodes in S is enumerated in one direction, and the ordered
set of nodes in T is enumerated in the opposite direction on
the path. The nodes are enumerated such that one of the two
end nodes of P is labeled S1. Proceeding on P and inspecting
the next node, if the node does not communicate with a node
that has already been enumerated, it will be the next node
in S, using ascending indices for Si. Otherwise, it will be in
T , using descending indices for Ti. Therefore, node T1 will
always be the other end node on P. The example in Figure 1
shows how ten nodes, in five connections are assigned to S
and T . The bidirectional protection path is shown as a dashed
line.
Under normal working conditions the working circuit will
be used to deliver di and uj data units from Si to Tj and from
S5
S1
T4T1
u3
u1
d2
u2 u4
d5d1
u5
T2 T3
S3 S4
d3 d4
S
T
S2
T5
Fig. 1. An example of enumerating the nodes in five connections. Node T5
is the first node to be encountered while traversing S, which communicates
with a node in S that has already been enumerated (S2).
Tj to Si, respectively. The basic idea for receiving a second
copy of data uj by node Si, for example, is to receive on two
opposite directions on the protection path, P, the signals given
by the following two equations, where all data units belong to
the same round, n: ∑
k, Sk∈A
dk +
∑
k, Tk∈B
uˆk (1)
uj +
∑
k, Tk∈B
uk +
∑
k, Sk∈A
dˆk (2)
where A and B are disjoint subsets of nodes in the ordered
set of nodes S and T , respectively, such that a node in A
communicates with a node in B, and vice versa. If the link
between Si and Tj fails, then uj can be recovered by Si by
simply adding equations (1) and (2).
We now outline the steps involved in the construction
of the primary/protection paths and the encoding/decoding
operations at the individual nodes.
A. Protection Path Construction and Node Enumeration
1) Find a bidirectional path5, P, that goes through all the
end nodes of the connections in N. P consists of two
unidirectional paths in opposite directions. These two
unidirectional paths do not have to traverse the same
links, but must traverse the nodes in the opposite order.
One of these paths will be referred to as S and the other
one as T.
2) Given the set of nodes in all N connections which are
to be protected together, construct the ordered sets of
nodes, S and T , as explained above
3) A node Si in S (Tj in T ) transmits di (uj) data units to
a node in T (S) on the primary path, which is received
as dˆi (uˆj).
4) Transmissions on the two unidirectional paths S and
T are in rounds, and are started by nodes S1 and T1,
5The path is not necessarily a simple path, i.e., vertices and links may be
repeated. We make this assumption in order to allow the implementation of
our proposed scheme in networks where some nodes have a nodal degree of
two. Although the graph theoretic name for this type of paths is a walk, we
continue to use the term path for ease of notation and description.
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10
4
8
11
12
2
5
3
6
13
9
10
7
S1
S2
T2
T1
S1
T2
S2
’
’
’
T1’
Fig. 2. An example of provisioning and protecting four connections on
NSFNET.
respectively. All the processing of data units occurs
between data units belonging to the same round.
It is to be noted that it may not be possible to protect all
connections together, and therefore it would be necessary
to partition the set of connections, and protect connections
in each partition together. We illustrate this point using the
example shown in Figure 2, where there are four connections
(shown using bold lines) that are provisioned on NSFNET:
C1 = (3, 12), C2 = (4, 10), C3 = (0, 7) and C4 = (1, 11).
It is not possible to protect all four connections together
using one protection path that is link disjoint from all four
connections. Therefore, in this example, we use two protection
paths: one protection path (3,4,5,8,10,12) protecting C1 and
C2, and is shown in dashed lines; and another protection path
(0,1,3,4,6,7,10,13,11) protecting C3 and C4, and is shown in
dotted lines. Notice that all connections that are protected
together, and their protection path are link disjoint. The end
nodes in C1 and C2 are labeled S1, S2, T1 and T2, while
the end nodes in C3 and C4 are labeled S′1, S′2, T ′1 and T ′2,
respectively. In the above example, it is assumed that each
connection is established at an electronic layer, i.e., an overlay
layer above the physical layer. For example, the working path
of a connection can be routed and established as an MPLS
Label Switched Path (LSP), which can be explicitly routed in
the network, as shown in the figure, and therefore the paths of
the connections which are jointly protected, e.g., C1 and C2 in
the above example, can be made link disjoint. However, when
it comes to the protection path, since the data units transmitted
on this path need to be processed, the protection path can be
provisioned as segments, where each segment is an MPLS
LSP which is explicitly routed. For the example of Figure 2,
the protection path protecting connections C1 and C2 can be
provisioned as three MPLS LSPs, namely, (3,4), (4,5,8,10) and
(10,12).
B. Encoding Operations on S and T
The network encoding operation is executed by each node
in S and T . To facilitate the specification of the encoding
protocol we first define the following.
• T (Si): node in T transmitting to and receiving from Si,
e.g. in Fig.1, T (S1) = T2.
• S(Tj): node in S transmitting to and receiving from Tj .
• σ(Si)/σ(Tj): the next node downstream from Si (respec-
tively Tj) on S, e.g., in Fig.1, σ(S2) = S3.
• σ−1(Si)/σ
−1(Tj): the next node upstream from Si (re-
spectively Tj) on S, e.g., in Fig.1, σ−1(T5) = S4.
• τ(Si)/τ(Tj): the next node downstream from Si (respec-
tively Tj) on T, e.g., in Fig. 1, τ(T4) = S5.
• τ−1(Si)/τ
−1(Tj): the next node upstream from Si (re-
spectively Tj) on T,e.g., in Fig.1, τ−1(S5) = T4.
We denote the data unit transmitted on link e ∈ S by ye and
the data unit transmitted on link e ∈ T by ze. Assume that
nodes Si and Tj are in the same connection. The encoding
operations work as follows, where all data units belong to the
same round.
1) Encoding operations at Si. The node Si has access to
data units di (that it generated) and data unit uˆj received
on the primary path from Tj .
a) It computes yσ−1(Si)→Si + (di + uˆj) and sends it
on the link Si → σ(Si); i.e.
ySi→σ(Si) = yσ−1(Si)→Si + (di + uˆj).
b) It computes zτ−1(Si)→Si + (di + uˆj) and sends it
on the link Si → τ(Si); i.e.
zSi→τ(Si) = zτ−1(Si)→Si + (di + uˆj).
2) Encoding operations at Tj . The node Tj has access to
data units uj (that it generated) and data unit dˆi received
on the primary path from Si.
a) It computes yσ−1(Tj)→Tj + (dˆi + uj) and sends it
on the link Tj → σ(Tj); i.e.
yTj→σ(Tj) = yσ−1(Tj)→Tj + (dˆi + uj)
b) It computes zτ−1(Tj)→Tj + (dˆi + uj) and sends it
on the link Tj → τ(Tj); i.e.
zTj→τ(Tj) = zτ−1(Tj)→Tj + (dˆi + uj)
An example in which three nodes perform this procedure in
the absence of failures is shown in Figure 3.
Consider S′ ⊆ S and let N (S′) represent the subset of
nodes in T that have a primary path connection to the nodes
in S′ (similar notation shall be used for a subset T ′ ⊆ T ).
Let DS(Si) and US(Si) represent the set of downstream and
upstream nodes of Si on the protection path S (similar notation
shall be used for the protection path T). When all nodes in S
and T have performed their encoding operations, the signals
received at a node Si on the S and T paths, respectively, are
4
T3T2T1
S2S1 S3
d2 d3d1
u1
u2 u3
d1+u1
d1+u1+
d2+u2+
d3+u3
d1+u1+
d2+u2
d2+u2
d1+u1+d1+u1
u1+d1 u1+d1+
u2+d2
u1+d1+
u2+d2+
u3+d3
u1+d1 u2+d2
u1+d1+
^
^
^
^
^
^
^
^^
^ ^
^
^ ^
^
^
^
^
S
T
Fig. 3. Example of three nodes performing the encoding procedure. Note
that the addition (bitwise XOR) of two copies of the same data unit, e.g., di
and dˆi, removes both of them.
as follows
yσ−1(Si)→Si
=
∑
{k:Sk∈US(Si)∩S}
dk +
∑
{k:Tk∈N (US(Si)∩S)}
uˆk
︸ ︷︷ ︸
From nodes upstream of Si on S in S
+
∑
{k:Tk∈US(Si)∩T }
uk +
∑
{k:Sk∈N (US(Si)∩T )}
dˆk
︸ ︷︷ ︸
From nodes upstream of Si on S in T
, and (3)
zτ−1(Si)→Si
=
∑
{k:Sk∈UT(Si)∩S}
dk +
∑
{k:Tk∈N (UT(Si)∩S)}
uˆk
︸ ︷︷ ︸
From nodes upstream of Si on T in S
+
∑
{k:Tk∈UT(Si)∩T }
uk +
∑
{k:Sk∈N (UT(Si)∩T )}
dˆk
︸ ︷︷ ︸
From nodes upstream of Si on T in T
(4)
Similar equations can be derived for node Tj .
C. Recovery from failures
The encoding operations described in Subsection III-B allow
the recovery of a second copy of the same data unit transmitted
on the working circuit, hence protecting against single link
failures. To illustrate this, suppose that the primary path
between nodes Si and Tj fails. In this case, Si does not
receive uj on the primary path, and it receives uˆj = 0 instead.
Moreover, dˆi = 0. However, Si can recover uj by adding
equations (3) and (4). In particular node Si computes
yσ−1(Si)→Si + zτ−1(Si)→Si =
∑
{k:Sk∈S\{Si}}
dk +
∑
{k:Tk∈T }
uk
+
∑
{k:Tk∈T \{Tj}}
uˆk +
∑
{k:Sk∈S}
dˆk
= dˆi + uj
= uj (since dˆi = 0.) (5)
Similarly, Tj can recover di by adding the values it obtains
over S and T . For example, if the working path between S2
and T2 in Figure 3 fails, then at node S2 adding the signal
received on S to the signal received on T, then u2 can be
recovered, since T2 generated u2. Also, node T2 adds the
signals on S and T to recover d2.
Notice that the reception of a second copy of u2 and d2 at
S2 and T2, respectively, when there are no failures, requires
the addition of the d2 and u2 signals generated by the same
nodes, respectively.
As a more general example, consider the case in Figure 1.
Node S5, for example, will receive the following signal on S:
(d1+ uˆ2)+(d2+ uˆ5)+(d3+ uˆ1)+(d4+ uˆ4)+(u5+ dˆ2), (6)
and will receive the following on T:
(u1 + dˆ3) + (u2 + dˆ1) + (u3 + dˆ5) + (u4 + dˆ4). (7)
If the link between S5 and T3 fails, then dˆ5 = 0, and adding
equations (6) and (7) will recover u3 at S5.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
In this subsection we address a number of practical imple-
mentation issues.
A. Round Numbers
Since linear combinations include packets belonging to
the same round number, the packet header should include a
round number field. The field is initially reset to zero, and is
updated independently by each node when it generates and
sends a new packet on the working circuit. Note that there
will be a delay before the linear combination propagating on
S and T reaches a given node. For example, in Figure 3
assuming that all nodes started transmission at time 0, node S3
shall receive the combination corresponding to round 0 over
S, d1(0) + uˆ1(0) + d2(0) + uˆ2(0) after a delay corresponding
to the propagation delay between nodes S1 and S3, in addition
to the processing and transmission times at nodes S1 and S2.
However since the received data unit shall contain the round
number 0, it shall be combined with the data unit generated
by S3 at time slot 0.
The size of the round number field depends on the delay
of the protection path, including processing and transmission
times, as well as propagation time, and the working circuit
delay. It is reasonable to assume that the delay of any working
circuit is shorter than that of the protection circuit; otherwise,
the protection path could have been used as a working path.
Thus, when a data unit on the protection path corresponding
to a particular round number reaches a given node, the data
unit of that round number would have already been received
on the primary path of the node.
In this case, it is straightforward to see that once a data
unit is transmitted on the working circuit, then it will take no
more than twice the delay of the protection path to recover
the backup copy of this data unit by the receiver. Therefore,
round numbers can then be reused. Based on this argument,
5
the size of the set of required unique round numbers is upper
bounded by 2a, where
a = ⌈
χP
(Protection data unit size in bits)/B
⌉ . (8)
χP in the above equation is the delay over the protection
circuit, and B is the transport capacity of the protection circuit,
which, as stated in Section II-B, is taken as the maximum
over all the transport capacities of the protected connections.
A sufficiently long round number field will require no more
than log2(2a) bits.
B. Synchronization
An important issue is node synchronization to rounds. This
can be achieved using a number of strategies. A simple strategy
for initialization and synchronization is the following:
• In addition to buffers used to store transmitted and
received data units, each node Si ∈ S has two buffers,
FS(Si) and FT(Si), which are used for transmissions on
the S and T paths, respectively. Node Tj ∈ T also has
similar buffers, FS(Tj) and FT(Tj).
• Node S1 starts the transmission of d1(0) on the working
circuit to T (S1). When S1 receives uˆT (S1)(0), it forms
d1(0)+ uˆT (S1)(0) and transmits it on the outgoing link in
S. Similarly, node T1 will transmit u1(0) on the working
circuit, and u1(0)+ dˆS(T1)(0) on the outgoing link in T.
• Node Si, for i > 0, will buffer the combinations received
on S in FS(Si). Assume that the combination with the
smallest round number buffered in FS(Si) (i.e., head
of buffer) corresponds to round number n. When Si
transmits di(n) and receives uˆT (Si)(n), then it adds
those data units to the combination with the smallest
round number in FS(Si) and transmits the combination
on S. The combination with round number n is then
purged from FS(Si). Similar operations are performed
on FT(Si), FS(Tj) and FT(Tj). Note that purging of
the data unit from the buffer only implies that the
combination corresponding to round n has been sent and
should not be sent again. However node Si needs to
ensure that it saves the value of the data unit received on
S as long as needed for it to be able to decode uT (Si)(n)
if needed. An illustration of the use of those buffers is
shown in Figure 4.
C. Buffer Size
Assuming that all nodes start transmitting simultaneously,
then all nodes would have decoded the data units correspond-
ing to a given round number in a time that does not exceed
χP + max
1≤w≤N
χw
where χw is the delay over working path w.
Based on this, the following upper bounds on buffer sizes
can be established:
• The transmit buffer, as well as the FS and FT buffers are
upper bounded by
⌈
χP +max1≤w≤N χw
Data unit size in bits/B
⌉ .
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Fig. 4. An illustration of the use of node buffer FS(Si). (a) Shows the status
of the buffers before data unit at round n has been processed. (b) Shows the
status of the buffers after the data unit at round n has been processed. Note
that the data units corresponding to round n have been purged from both
FS(Si) and the primary path receive buffer. The operation of other buffers
is similar.
This is because it will take χw units of time over the path
w used by the connection S(T1) ↔ T1 to receive dˆS(T1),
and then start transmission on the T path. An additional
χP units of time is required for the first combination to
reach S1. The numerator in the above equation is the
maximum of this delay.
• The receive buffer is upper bounded by
⌈
χP +max1≤w≤N χw −min1≤w≤N χw
Data unit size in bits/B
⌉ .
The numerator in the above equation is derived using
arguments similar to the transmit buffer, except that for
the first data unit to be received, it will have to encounter
the delay over the working circuit; hence, the subtraction
of the minimum such delay.
V. PROTECTION AGAINST MULTIPLE FAULTS
We now consider the situation when protection against
multiple (more than one) link failures is required. In this case it
is intuitively clear that a given primary path connection needs
to be protected by multiple bi-directional protection paths. To
see this we first analyze the sum of the signals received on
S and T for a node Si that has a connection to node Tj
when the primary paths Si ↔ Tj and Si′ ↔ Tj′ protected by
the same protection path are in failure. In this case we have
dˆi = dˆi′ = uˆj = uˆj′ = 0. Therefore, at node Si we have,
yσ−1(Si)→Si + zτ−1(Si)→Si =
∑
{k:Sk∈S\{Si}}
dk +
∑
{k:Tk∈T }
uk
+
∑
{k:Tk∈T \{Tj}}
uˆk +
∑
{k:Sk∈S}
dˆk
= (di′ + uj′) + uj .
Note that node Si is only interested in the data unit uj but it
can only recover the sum of uj and the term (di′ + uj′), in
which it is not interested.
We now demonstrate that if a given connection is protected
by multiple protection paths, a modification of the protocol
presented in Section III-B can enable the nodes to recover from
multiple failures. In the modified protocol a node multiplies
the sum of its own data unit and the data unit received over
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its primary path by an appropriately chosen scaling coefficient
before adding it to the signals on the protection path. The
scheme in Section III-B can be considered to be a special
case of this protocol when the scaling coefficient is 1 (i.e., the
identity element over GF (2m)).
It is important to note that in contrast to the approach
presented in [14], this protocol does not require any syn-
chronization between the operation of the different protection
paths.
As before, suppose that there are N bi-directional unicast
connections that are to be protected against the failure of any
M links, for M ≤ N . These connections are now protected
by K protection paths Pk, k = 1, . . . ,K . Protection path Pk
passes through all nodes Sk ⊆ S and Tk ⊆ T where the
nodes in Sk communicate bi-directionally with the nodes in
Tk. Note that ∪Kk=1Sk = S and ∪Kk=1Tk = T . The ordered
sets Sk and Sl are not necessarily disjoint for l 6= k, i.e., a
primary path can be protected by different protection paths.
However, if two protection paths are used to protect the same
working connection, then they must be link disjoint.
A. Modified Encoding Operation
Assume that nodes Si and Tj are protected by the protection
path Pk. The encoding operations performed by Si and Tj
for path Pk are explained below (the operations for other
protection paths are similar). In the presentation below we
shall use the notation σ(Si), σ−1(Si), τ(Si), τ−1(Si) to be
defined implicitly over the protection path Pk. Similar notation
is used for Tj .
The nodes Si and Tj initially agree on a value of the scaling
coefficient denoted αi↔j,k ∈ GF (2m). The subscript i↔ j, k
denotes that the scaling coefficient is used for connection Si
to Tj over protection path Pk.
1) Encoding operations at Si. The node Si has access to
data units di (that it generated) and data unit uˆj received
on the primary path from Tj .
a) It computes yσ−1(Si)→Si + αi↔j,k(di + uˆj) and
sends it on the link Si → σ(Si); i.e.
ySi→σ(Si) = yσ−1(Si)→Si + αi↔j,k(di + uˆj).
b) It computes zτ−1(Si)→Si + αi↔j,k(di + uˆj) and
sends it on the link Si → τ(Si); i.e.
zSi→τ(Si) = zτ−1(Si)→Si + αi↔j,k(di + uˆj).
2) Encoding operations at Tj . The node Tj has access to
data units uj (that it generated) and data unit dˆi received
on the primary path from Si.
a) It computes yσ−1(Tj)→Tj + αi↔j,k(dˆi + uj) and
sends it on the link Tj → σ(Tj); i.e.
yTj→σ(Tj) = yσ−1(Tj)→Tj + αi↔j,k(dˆi + uj)
b) It computes zτ−1(Tj)→Tj + αi↔j,k(dˆi + uj) and
sends it on the link Tj → τ(Tj); i.e.
zTj→τ(Tj) = zτ−1(Tj)→Tj + αi↔j,k(dˆi + uj)
It should be clear that we can find expressions similar to the
ones in (3) and (4) in this case as well.
B. Recovery from failures
Suppose that the primary paths Si ↔ Tj and Si′ ↔ Tj′ fail,
and they are both protected by Pk. Consider the sum of the
signals received by node Si over Sk and Tk. Similar to our
discussion in III-C, we can observe that
yσ−1(Si)→Si + zτ−1(Si)→Si = αi′↔j′,k(di′ + uj′) + αi↔j,kuj
Note that the structure of the equation allows the node Si to
treat (di′ + ui′) as a single unknown. Thus from protection
path Pk, node Si obtains one equation in two variables. Now,
if there exists another protection path Pl that also protects the
connections Si ↔ Tj and Si′ ↔ Tj′ , then we can obtain the
following system of equations in two variables[
αi′↔j′,k αi↔j,k
αi′↔j′,l αi↔j,l
] [
(di′ + uj′)
uj
]
=
[
xkSi
xlSi
]
, (9)
where xkSi and x
l
Si
represent values that can be obtained
at Si and therefore uj can be recovered by solving the
system of equations. The choice of the scaling coefficients
needs to be such that the associated 2 × 2 matrix in (9) is
invertible. This can be guaranteed by a careful assignment
of the scaling coefficients. More generally we shall need to
ensure that a large number of such matrices need to be full-
rank. By choosing the operating field size GF (2m) to be large
enough, i.e., m to be large enough we can ensure that such
an assignment of scaling coefficients always exists [24]. The
detailed discussion of coefficient assignment can be found in
Section VI.
C. Conditions for Data Recovery:
We shall first discuss the conditions for data recovery under
a certain failure pattern. To facilitate the discussion on deter-
mining which failures can be recovered from, we represent the
failed connections, and the protection paths using a bipartite
graph, GDR(V,E), where the set of vertices V = N∪ P, and
the set of edges E ⊆ N×P where N is the set of connections
to be protected, and P is the set of protection paths. There is
an edge from connection Ni ∈ N to protection path Pk ∈ P if
Pk protects connection Ni. In addition, each edge has a label
that is assigned as follows. Suppose that there exists an edge
between Ni (between nodes Si′ and Tj′ ) and Pk. The label
on the edge is given by the scaling coefficient αi′↔j′,k.
Note that in general one could have link failures on primary
paths as well as protection paths. Suppose that a failure pattern
is specified as a set F = {Ni1 , . . .Nin} ∪ {Pj1 , . . . ,Pjn′ }
where {Ni1 , . . .Nin} denotes the set of primary paths that
have failed and {Pj1 , . . . ,Pjn′ } denotes the set of protection
paths that have failed. The determination of whether a given
node can recover from the failures in F can be performed in
the following manner.
1) Initialization. Form the graph GDR(V,E) as explained
above.
2) Edge pruning.
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Fig. 5. An example of a network protected against multiple faults.
a) For all connections Ni ∈ N \F remove Ni and all
edges in which it participates from GDR.
b) For all protection paths Pi ∈ F remove Pi and all
edges in which it participates from GDR.
3) Checking the system of equations. Let the residual graph
be denoted G′DR = (N
′
∪ P
′
,E
′
). For each connection
Ni ∈ N
′
, do the following steps.
a) Let the subset of nodes in P′ that have a connection
to Ni be denoted N (Ni). Each node in N (Ni)
corresponds to a linear equation that is available
to the nodes participating in Ni. The linear com-
bination coefficients are determined by the labels
of the edges. Identify this system of equations.
b) Check to see whether a node in Ni can solve this
system of equations to obtain the data unit it is
interested in.
In Figure 6 we show an example that applies to the
network in Figure 5. Figure 6.(a) shows the bipartite graph
for the entire network, while Figures 6.(b) and 6.(c) show
the graph corresponding to the following two failing patterns,
respectively:
• (S2, T2), (S6, T6) and (S5, T5)
• P2, (S2, T2) and (S6, T6)
Let us assume that the encoding coefficients are chosen to
make sure the equation obtained by each node has unique so-
lution. From Figure 6.(b), the failures of connections (S2, T2)
and (S6, T6) can be recovered from because each node obtains
two equations in two unknowns. More specifically, at node
S2 we obtain the following system of equations (the equation
from P1 is not used).[
α2↔2,2 α6↔6,2
α2↔2,3 α6↔6,3
] [
u2
(d6 + u6)
]
=
[
x2S2
x3S2
]
,
which has a unique solution if (α2↔2,2α6↔6,3 −
α2↔2,3α6↔6,2) 6= 0. As pointed out in Section V-B,
the choice of the scaling coefficients can be made so that all
possible matrices involved have full rank by working over
a large enough field size. Thus in this case S2 and T2 can
recover from the failures. By a similar argument we can
(S1,T1)
(S3,T3)
(S4,T4)
(S5,T5)
(S6,T6)
(S7,T7)
(S2,T2) P1
P2
P3
(a)
(S5,T5)
(S6,T6)
(S2,T2)
P1
P2
P3 (S6,T6)
(S2,T2) P1
P3
(b) (c)
Fig. 6. Applying the bipartite graph representation verify if failures will be
recovered.
observe that S6 and T6 can also recover from the failures by
using the equations from P2 and P3. However, S5 and T5
cannot recover from the failure since they can only obtain
one equation from P1 in two variables that corresponds to
failures on (S2, T2) and (S5, T5). In Figure 6.(c), path P2
does not exist, and (S6,T6) is protected only by path P3,
which protects two failed connections. Therefore, it cannot
recover from the failure. However, (S2, T2) can still recover
its data units by using path P1.
In general, this procedure needs to be performed for every
possible failure pattern that needs to be protected against, for
checking whether all nodes can still recover the data unit
that they are interested in. However, usually the set of failure
patterns to be protected against is the set of all single link
failures or more generally the set of all possible M ≥ 1
link failures. Those M link failures can happen anywhere,
on primary paths or protection paths.
Next, we consider general conditions for data recovery.
First, we describe the general model for multiple failures.
In order to make expressions simple, we assume that the
data unit obtained by a node of a failed connection, say
Si, from protection path Pk is the sum of the data units
from Sk, Tk . Adding up with αi↔j,kdi, which is the data
units generated at node Si, we denote this sum by pk where
pk = yσ−1(Si)→Si + zτ−1(Si)→Si + αi↔j,kdi. Note that di is
the local data units, which is always available. In this case,
each node on one protection path Pk obtains the same equation
in terms of the same variables. By denoting the set of failed
primary connections protected by Pk as F (Pk), the equation
for this protection path Pk is∑
(Si↔Tj)∈F (Pk)
αi↔j,k(di + uj) = pk. (10)
In equation (10), each di+uj is considered as one variable
and the coefficients assigned to di and uj are the same. Each
node of a failed connection will obtain one equation from each
intact protection path that protects it and consequently forms
a system of linear equations. The number of equations that
node Si obtains is the number of intact protection paths that
protect Si. The number of variables is the total number of
failed connections protected by the protection paths that also
provide protection to the failed connection between Si and Tj .
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Si needs to solve the system of equations and obtain di + uj .
By subtracting di, it can get uj , which is the data unit Si wants
to receive while Tj can retrieve the data di by subtracting uj
from di + uj .
Each protection path maps to an equation in terms of a
number of variables representing the combination of the data
units generated at two end nodes of the failed connections
protected by this path. We can form a system of equations that
consists of at most K equations like equation (10) where K is
the total number of protection paths. Each failure of a primary
path introduces a variable whereas each failure occurring on
a protection path erases the corresponding equation from the
matrix. In general, the system of equations that a node obtains
also depends on the topology. If all of the connections are not
protected by the same protection paths, there are zeros in the
coefficient matrix because a failed connection is not protected
by all protection paths, implying that some variables will not
appear in all equations.
In order to recover from any failure pattern of M failures,
we require the following necessary conditions.
Theorem 1: In order for the network to be guaranteed
protection against any M link failures, the following necessary
conditions should be satisfied.
1) Each node should be protected by at least M link-
disjoint protection paths.
2) Under any failure pattern with M failures, a subset of
equations that each node obtains should have a unique
solution.
proof: The first condition can be shown by contradiction. If
a node is protected by M − 1 protection paths, the failure
could happen on these M − 1 protection paths and on the
primary path in which this node participates. Then, this node
does not have any protection path to recover from its primary
path failure.
The second condition is to ensure that each node can recover
the data unit under any failure pattern with M failures. Note
that for necessary condition, we don’t require that the whole
system of equations each node obtains has unique solution
because one node is only interested in recovering the data unit
sent to it. As long as it can solve a subset of the equations, it
recovers from its failure.
We emphasize that the structure of the equations depends
heavily on the network topology, the connections provisioned
and the protection paths. Therefore it is hard to state a more
specific result about the conditions under which protection
is guaranteed. However, under certain structured topologies it
may be possible to provide a characterization of the conditions
that can be checked without having to verify each possible
system of equations.
For example, if all connections are protected by M protec-
tion paths, it is easy to see the sufficient condition for data
recovery from any M failures is that the coefficient matrix of
the system of equations each node obtains under any failure
pattern with M failures has full rank. As will be shown next,
our coefficient assignment methods are such that the sufficient
conditions above hold.
Next we construct a K×N matrix to facilitate the discussion
of coefficient assignment. According to the encoding protocol,
each connection Si−Tj has coefficient αi↔j,k for encoding on
Pk. In general, there are at most K×N coefficients for a net-
work with N primary paths Si1 ↔ Tj1 , Si2 ↔ Tj2 , . . . , Sil ↔
Tjl , . . . , SiN ↔ TjN and K protection paths P1,P2, . . . ,PK .
We form a K×N matrix A whereAkl = αil↔jl,k if Sil ↔ Til
is protected by Pk, Akl = 0 otherwise. Here, l is the index
for primary paths and each column of A corresponds to a
primary path. Each row of A corresponds to a protection path.
This matrix contains all encoding coefficients and some zeros
induced by the topology in general. It is easy to see that under
any failure pattern, the coefficient matrix of the system of
equations at any node of any failed connection is a submatrix
of matrix A. We require these submatrices of A to have full
rank. We shall discuss the construction of A, i.e., assign proper
coefficients in Section VI.
VI. ENCODING COEFFICIENT ASSIGNMENT
In this section, we shall discuss encoding coefficient as-
signment strategies for the proposed network coding schemes,
i.e., construct A properly. Under certain assumptions on the
topology, two special matrix based assignments can provide
tight field size bound and efficient decoding algorithms. We
shall also introduce matrix completion method for general
topologies.
Note that the coefficient assignment is done before the ac-
tual transmission. Once the coefficients have been determined,
during data transmission they need not be changed. Thus,
for the schemes that guarantee successful recovery with high
probability, we can keep generating the matrix A until the full
rank condition discussed at the end of the previous section
satisfies. This only needs to be done once. After that, during
the actual transmission, the recovery is successful for sure.
A. Special matrix based assignment
In this and the next subsection, we assume that all primary
paths are protected by the same protection paths. This implies
that matrix A only consists of encoding coefficients. It does
not contain zeros induced by the topology. Thus, we can let
A to be a matrix with some special structures such that any
submatrix of A has full rank. The network will be able to
recover from any failure pattern with M (or less) failures.
Without loss of generality, we shall focus on the case when
M = K , where K is the number of protection paths. If M
failures happen, in which t1 failures happen on primary paths,
each node will get M − (M − t1) = t1 equations with t1
unknowns corresponding to t1 primary path failures. The t1×
t1 coefficient matrix is a square submatrix of A and they are
the same for each node under one failure pattern.
First, we shall show a Vandermonde matrix-based coeffi-
cient assignment. It requires the field size to be q ≥ N . If
all failures happen on primary paths, the recovery at each
node is guaranteed. In this assignment strategy, we pick up
N distinct elements from GF (q): λ1, . . . , λN and assign
them to each primary paths. At nodes Sil and Tjl , λk−1l
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is used as encoding coefficient on protection path Pk, i.e.,
Akl = αil↔jl,k = λ
k−1
l . In other words, A is a Vandermonde
matrix [26, Section 6.1]:

1 1 · · · 1
λ1 λ2 · · · λN
λ21 λ
2
2 · · · λ
2
N
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
λK−11 λ
K−1
2 · · · λ
K−1
N

 .
Suppose M failures happen on primary paths, the indices of
failed connections are e1, . . . , eM , every node gets a system
of linear equations with coefficient matrix having this form:

1 1 · · · 1
λe1 λe2 · · · λeM
λ2e1 λ
2
e2
· · · λ2eM
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
λM−1e1 λ
M−1
e2
· · · λM−1eM

 .
This matrix is a M × M Vandermonde matrix. As long as
λe1 , λe2 , . . . , λeM are distinct, this matrix is invertible and Sie1
can recover uje1 . We choose λ1, . . . , λN to be distinct so that
the submatrix formed by any M columns of A has full rank.
The smallest field size we need is the number of connections
we want to protect, i.e., q ≥ N . Moreover, the complexity of
solving linear equation with Vandermonde coefficient matrix is
O(M2)[19]. Thus, we have a more efficient decoding because
if the coefficients are arbitrarily chosen, even if it is solvable,
the complexity of Gaussian elimination is O(M3).
If M − t1 failures happen on protection paths, we require
that any t1 × t1 square submatrix formed by choosing any
t1 columns and t1 rows from A has full rank. Although the
chance is large, the Vandermonde matrix can not guarantee
this for sure [20, p.323,problem 7],[22],[23]. We shall propose
another special matrix to guarantee that for combined failures,
the recovery is successful at the expense of a slightly larger
field size compared to Vandermonde matrix assignment.
In order to achieve this goal, we resort to Cauchy matrix
[20], of which any square submatrix has full rank if the entries
are chosen carefully.
Definition 2: Let {x1, . . . , xm1}, {y1, . . . , ym2} be two sets
of elements in a field F such that
(i) xi + yj 6= 0, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m1} ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m2};
(ii) ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m1}, i 6= j : xi 6= xj and ∀i, j ∈
{1, . . . ,m2}, i 6= j : yi 6= yj .
The matrix C = (cij) where cij = 1/(xi + yj) is called a
Cauchy matrix.
If m1 = m2, the Cauchy matrix becomes square and its
determinant is [20]:
det(C) =
∏
1≤i<j≤m1
(xj − xi)(yj − yi)∏
1≤i,j≤m1
(xi + yj)
Note that in GF (q) where q is some power of 2, the
addition and subtraction are equivalent. Therefore, as long
as x1, . . . , xm1 , y1, . . . , ym1 are distinct, Cauchy matrix has
full rank and its any square submatrix is also a Cauchy
matrix (by definition) with full rank. For our protection
problem, we let matrix A to be a K × N Cauchy matrix.
{x1, . . . , xK}, {y1, . . . , yN} are chosen to be distinct. Thus,
the smallest field size we need is K + N . Suppose there are
t1 failures on primary paths and M − t1 failures on protection
paths, the coefficient matrix of the system of equations ob-
tained by a node is a t1×t1 submatrix of A. It is still a Cauchy
matrix by definition and invertible. Thus, the network can be
recovered from any M failures. Moreover, the inversion can
be done in O(t21) [21], which provides an efficient decoding
algorithm.
B. Random assignment
We could also choose the coefficients from a large finite
field. More specifically, we have the following claim [27].
Claim 3: When all coefficients are randomly, independently
and uniformly chosen from GF (q), the probability that a t1-
by-t1 matrix has full rank is p(t1) = Πt1i=1(1 − 1/qi), 1 ≤
t1 ≤M .
Under one failure pattern with t1 failures on the primary
paths and M − t1 failures on the protection paths, every
failed connection obtains the equations that have the same
t1-by-t1 coefficient matrix. The probability that it is full
rank is p(t1) and it goes to 1 when q is large. Note that
there are
∑M
t1=1
(
N
t1
)(
M
M−t1
)
possible failure patterns when
the total number of failures is M . Thus, by union bound, the
probability of successful recovery under any failure pattern
with M failures is 1 −
∑M
t1=1
(
N
t1
)(
M
M−t1
)
(1 − p(t1)), and it
approaches 1 as q increases.
C. Matrix completion for general topology
If the primary paths are protected by different protection
paths, like in Figure 5, there are some zeros in A induced
by the topology. We want to choose encoding coefficients so
that under every failure pattern with M or less failures, the
coefficient matrix of the system of equations obtained by every
node is invertible. We can view the encoding coefficients in A
as indeterminates to be decided. The matrices we require to
have full rank are a collection CA of submatrices of A, where
CA depends on the failure patterns and the network topology.
Each matrix in CA consists of some indeterminates and some
zeros. The problem of choosing encoding coefficients can be
solved by matrix completion [24]. A simultaneous max-rank
completion of CA is an assignment of values from GF (q)
to the indeterminates that preserves the rank of all matrices
in CA. After completion, each matrix will have the maximum
possible rank. Matrix completion can be done by deterministic
algorithms [24]. Moreover, simply choosing a completion
at random from a sufficiently large field can achieve the
maximum rank with high probability [25]. Hence, we can
choose encoding coefficients randomly from a large field.
VII. ILP FORMULATION FOR SINGLE-LINK FAILURE
The problem of provisioning the working paths and their
protection paths in a random graph is a hard problem. This
is due to the fact that the problem of finding link disjoint
paths between multiple pairs of nodes in a graph is known to
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Fig. 7. An example to show: (a) the graph G in solid line and its modified
graph G′; (b) the provisioning of the connections ((0-3) and (5-3-2)) and
their protection path (s-5-0-2-1-3-t), where the two links (s-5) and (3-t) are
not included in the cost of the protection circuit.
be NP-complete [17]. Therefore, in this section we formulate
an integer linear program that optimally provisions a set of
unicast connections, and their protection paths against single-
link failure. The optimality criterion is the minimization of the
sum of the working and protection resources.
The problem can be stated as follows: Given an bidi-
rectional graph G = (V,E) and a traffic demand matrix
of unicast connections, N, establish a connection for each
bidirectional traffic request j ∈ N, and a number of protection
paths that travel all the end nodes of the connections in N,
defined by set C, such that:
• A path protecting a connection must pass through the end
nodes of the connection.
• The connections jointly protected by the same path must
be mutually link disjoint, and also link disjoint from the
protection path.
• The total number of edges used for both working and
protection paths is minimum.
We also assume that the network is uncapacitated.
In order to formulate this problem, we modify the graph G
to obtain the graph G′ by adding a hypothetical source s and a
hypothetical sink t. We also add a directed edge from s to each
node v, where v ∈ C, as well as a directed edge from each
such node v to t. An example is shown in Figure 7. Figure
7.(a) shows a graph G with six nodes and ten bidirectional
edges and the corresponding modification to the graph G′
given two traffic requests N = {(0, 3), (5, 2)}. Figure 7.(b)
shows the provisioning of the two connections in N and their
protection path from s to t. Therefore, the problem of finding
the protection paths turns out to be establishing connections
from node s to t that traverse all the nodes v ∈ C. For each
subset of connections that are protected together, the two ends
nodes of these traffic requests have to be traversed by the same
protection path.
This disjoint paths routing problem can be formulated with
ILP as follow: (Note that G = (V,E) and G′ = (V ′, E′)
denote the original and modified graph in the formulation). It
is to be noted that the number of protection paths must satisfy:
1 ≤ number of protection paths ≤ N.
We may have more than one protection path because it
is possible that the primary connections are partitioned into
several sets and each set of primary connections share the
protection of path. However, the worst case is that each
primary path requires a unique protection path (the case of 1+1
protection), which results in a total of N protection paths. In
the formulation, therefore, we have a maximum of 2N paths:
• Connections indexed from 1 to N are the ones given by
the set N, and these should be provisioned in the network.
• Connections indexed from N+1 to 2N are hypothetical
connections, which correspond to protection connections,
and at least one of them should be provisioned.
The ILP is formulated as a network flow problem, where
there is a flow of one unit between each pair of end nodes of
a connection, and there is also a flow of one unit from s to t
for each protection path.
We define the following parameters, which are input to the
ILP:
G(V,E): the original network graph
G′(V ′, E′): the modified graph
N: the set of unicast connections
cmn: a constant, the cost of link (m,n) ∈ E
vj : set of end nodes of connection j in N,
vj = {sj , tj}, which are different notations
from the previous definition of a connection,
denoted by Si, Tj where i, j are the indices
for the nodes.
We also define the following binary variables which are
computed by the ILP:
f imn binary, equals 1 if the protection path i traverses
link (m,n) in G
Zf im integer, the number of times that the node m ∈ V
is traversed by path i
U ij binary, equals 1 if connection j is protected by
path i
pjmn binary, equals 1 if the working flow of j traverses
link (m,n) ∈ G
qjmn binary, equals 1 if the protection flow of j tra-
verses link (m,n) ∈ G
Zpjm integer, the number of times that node m ∈ V is
traversed by the working flow of j
Zqjm integer, the number of times that node m ∈ V is
traversed by the protection flow of j
The objective function is:
Minimize:
∑
(m,n)∈E
(
∑
1≤j≤N
pjmncmn +
∑
N<i≤2N
f imncmn)
The objective function minimizes the total cost of links used
by the working paths (first term) and by the protection paths
(second term). Note that a protection path at s and end at t in
the modified graph, G′, but we only consider the cost of links
in the original graph G.
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The constraints are such that:
1) Working Flow Conservation:
∑
{n:(sj ,n)∈E}
pjsjn = 1, j ≤ N ; (11)
∑
{n:(m,n)∈E}
pjmn = 2Zp
j
m, ∀m ∈ V \cj . (12)
The constraints (11) and (12) are standard flow conserva-
tion for working traffic which ensures that a bidirectional
path is established between end nodes sj and tj of
connection j.
2) Protection Flow Conservation:
For ∀j ≤ N, N < i ≤ 2N :∑
{n:(sj ,n)∈E}
qjsjn = 1; (13)
∑
{n:(m,n)∈E}
qjmn = 2Zq
j
m, ∀m ∈ V \vj ; (14)
Constraints (13) and (14) make sure that each connection
j has a protection flow.
∑
{n:(s,n)∈E′}
f isn ≤ 1; (15)
∑
{n:(m,n)∈E}
f imn = 2Zf
i
m, ∀m ∈ V ; (16)
The flow conservation of protection paths is ensured by
constraints (15) and (16). It is worth noting that not
every protection path i (N<i≤2N) is required unless it
is used for protection.
∑
N<i≤2N
U ij = 1; (17)
1
N
∑
j≤N
U ij ≤
∑
{n:(s,n)∈E′}
f isn; (18)
f imn ≥ q
j
mn + U
i
j − 1, ∀(m,n) ∈ E; (19)
Each working flow should be protected by exactly one
protection path, guaranteed by constraint (17). Mean-
while, any protection path i is provisioned only if it is
used to protect any working path j. Otherwise, we do
not need to provision it. Therefore, equation (18) ensures
this constraint. Furthermore, constraint (19) ensures that
if a protection path i protects connection j, it should
traverse the same links used by the protection flow qjmn.
3) Protection Path Sharing:
For ∀(m,n) ∈ E, N < i ≤ 2N :
pjmn + q
j
mn ≤ 1, ∀j ≤ N ; (20)
pjmn + f
i
mn + U
i
j ≤ 2, ∀j ≤ N ; (21)
pjmn + p
k
mn + U
i
j + U
i
k ≤ 3, ∀j < k ≤ N.(22)
The working flow and protection flow of each connec-
tion j should be link disjoint, reflected by constraint
(20). Each protection path may protect multiple connec-
tions so that it needs to traverse multiple corresponding
protection flows. Thus, each protection path should also
be link disjoint to all the working flow it protects. This
constraint is ensured by equation (21). Meanwhile, if
two connections are protected by the same path f , their
working flow should also be link disjoint such that
codewords can be decodes at each end nodes through
the protection path. The last constraint is guaranteed by
equation (22).
The total number of variables used in the ILP is (3N |V |+
3N |E|+N2) and the total number of constraints is (6N |V |+
2N +2N2|E|+N |E|+N2(N − 1)|E|), which is dominated
by O(N3|E|).
VIII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section presents numerical results of the cost of our
proposed protection scheme and compares it to 1+1 protection
and Shared Backup Path Protection (SBPP) in terms of total
resource requirements for protection against single-link failure.
SBPP has been proven to be the most capacity efficient
protection scheme and can achieve optimal solutions [12].
However, it is also a reactive protection mechanism and takes
time to detect, localize and recover from failures. We consider
two realistic network topologies, NSFNET and COST239,
as shown in Fig. 8 and 9, respectively. Both networks are
bidirectional and each bidirectional span e has a cost ce,
which equals the actual distance in kilometers between two
end nodes.
We first compare three schemes in terms of the total con-
nection and protection provisioning cost in both networks as
shown in Fig. 10 and 11, respectively. We obtained the results
by formulating the problems as ILPs using three different ap-
proaches. The x-axis denotes the number of connections in the
static traffic matrix and y-axis denotes the total network design
cost. Each value is the average cost over ten independent cases
and all approaches used identical traffic requests for each case.
Since SBPP is the most capacity efficient scheme, it
achieves the minimum cost. 1+N approach uses much lower
cost than 1+1, but is higher than SBPP in both networks.
We express the extra cost ratio of a scheme over SBPP by:
(Costscheme − CostSBPP )/CostSBPP . The extra cost ratio
of 1+N in NSFNET increases from 5.2% to 23% as the number
of connections increases from 2 to 7. Meanwhile, the extra cost
ratio of 1+1 over SBPP increases from 12% to 45%, which is
almost twice that of 1+N at each case. The advantage of 1+N
over 1+1 in COST239 is even more significant than NSFNET
12
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Fig. 11. Comparison of total cost in COST239 network
due to the larger average nodal degree, 4.6, compared to, 3, in
NSFNET. Hence, there is a higher chance for multiple primary
paths to share the same protection path, which results in lower
overall cost. Based on the results, we can observe that the extra
cost ratio of 1+N over SBPP in COST239 increases from 1.8%
to 11.1% whereas the ratio of 1+1 over SBPP increases from
10.2% to 38%, as the number of connections increases from
2 to 7. Actually, the cost of using 1+N is very close to the
optimal in COST239 network. The extra cost required by 1+N
over the optimal solution is less than 27% of that achieved by
1+1 scheme.
In fact, if we only consider the cost of protection, i.e.
exclude the cost of connection provisioning, 1+N protection
uses much lower resources than 1+1 protection. For example,
by examining one network scenario where there are seven
connections in COST239 network, the average protection cost
of using SBPP, 1+N and 1+1 protection schemes is 3586.0,
4313.5 and 6441.5, respectively. The saving ratio of 1+N to
1+1 is around 33%, which is higher than the saving ratio of
joint capacity cost (19.3%). This example further illustrates
the cost saving advantages of using 1+N protection over 1+1
protection.
In summary, 1+N protection has a traffic recovery speed
which is comparable 1+1 protection. However, it performs
significantly better than 1+1 scheme in terms of protection
cost. Compared with the most capacity efficient protection
scheme, SBPP, 1+N protection performs close to SBPP in
terms of total capacity cost in dense networks. However, SBPP
takes much longer to recover from failures due to the long
switch reconfiguration time and traffic rerouting, which are
not required in 1+N protection.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has introduced a resource efficient, and a fast
method for providing protection for a group of connections
such that a second copy of each data unit transmitted on
the working circuits can be recovered without the detection
of the failure, or rerouting data. This is done by linearly
combining the data units using the technique of network
coding, and transmitting these combinations on a shared set
of protection circuits in two opposite directions. The reduced
number of resources is due to the sharing of the protection
circuit to transmit linear combinations of data units from
multiple sources. The coding is the key to the instantaneous
recovery of the information. This provides protection against
any single link failure on any of the working circuits. The
paper also generalized this technique to provide protection
against multiple link failures.
The method introduced in this paper improves the technique
introduced in [15] and [14]. In particular, (a) it requires fewer
protection resources, and (b) it implements coding using a
simpler synchronization strategy. A cost comparison study of
providing protection against single link failures has shown
that the proposed technique introduces a significant saving
over typical protection schemes, such as 1+1 protection, while
achieving a comparable speed of recovery. The numerical
13
results also show that the cost of our 1+N scheme is close
to SBPP, the most capacity efficient protection scheme. How-
ever, the proposed scheme in our paper provides much faster
recovery than SBPP.
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